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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 










STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-08-cv-00112) 
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 12, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 14, 2011)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
2 
 Plaintiff Robert Tangle appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary 




On May 16, 2007, Tangle’s house was damaged in a fire.  Tangle’s 
property was insured by State Farm under a standard homeowner’s policy.  After 
the fire, Tangle submitted a claim to State Farm.  On May 18, 2007, the Erie 
Bureau of Police reported to State Farm that Tangle was suspected of arson.  An 
investigation by the Erie police and fire departments revealed the fire was ignited 
by a time-delay ignition device composed of a gasoline soaked electric blanket 
stuffed in a plastic container.  Due to the suspicious nature of the fire, State Farm 
assigned Tangle’s claim to its Special Investigation Unit, and hired an outside 
expert to investigate.     
Between June and October 2007, State Farm contacted Tangle with a series 
of requests for documents and records relating to his claim.  Tangle does not 
seriously contest that he was generally unresponsive to these requests, except with 
regards to a Personal Property Inventory (“PPI”), in which he documented an 
approximate loss of $37,983.  On July 24, 2007, Tangle met with Dolak, a State 
Farm representative, who reviewed the PPI with Tangle.  On August 20, 2007, 
                                                 
1
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over a District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment.  Hugh 
v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266 (3d Cir. 2005).  We apply the 
same test as the District Court: whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, 
and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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State Farm sent a revised copy of the PPI to Tangle. The revisions indicated there 
were items State Farm was willing to pay for when the claim settled, and that there 
were “open” items on the list which needed further discussion before State Farm 
would pay for them.   
On September 19, 2007, State Farm requested that Tangle submit to an 
examination under oath as part of its ongoing claim investigation.  In subsequent 
letters to Tangle, State Farm explained the examination was necessary before his 
claim could be settled.  After Tangle repeatedly failed to respond to State Farm’s 
scheduling requests, they unilaterally scheduled the examination for November 19, 
2007.  Tangle eventually contacted State Farm about the examination, and at his 
request the examination was postponed until February 18, 2008. 
On April 22, 2008, Tangle filed a two-count complaint against State Farm.  
The first count alleged State Farm had violated Pennsylvania’s Unfair Insurance 
Practices Act by failing to pay his claim.  Tangle’s second count alleged State 
Farm’s failure to pay the claim constituted a breach of contract.  The matter was 
referred to a United States Magistrate Judge.  After completing its claim 
investigation, State Farm issued Tangle a check for $46,459.62 on October 31, 
2008.  The payment included $40,448.04 for the actual cash value of the damage 
to his home, and $6,058.00 for the actual cash value of his personal property loss.  
Tangle deposited the check and did not subsequently amend his pleadings. State 
Farm moved for summary judgment.   
4 
On August 4, 2010, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and 
Recommendation concluding that State Farm’s motion for summary judgment 
should be granted as to both claims.  The District Court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation.  The Report and Recommendation determined that the bad faith 
claim could not succeed because State Farm had shown a reasonable basis for its 
action, and it had paid the claim, so the breach of contract claim could not 
succeed.  Tangle filed a timely notice of appeal. 
Although Tangle concedes that he agreed to dismiss his bad faith claim, the 
majority of his argument before us still sounds in bad faith.  Tangle’s brief now 
asserts State Farm breached their contract by violating an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.  Similarly, he urges that he was not paid in full for his 
loss.  However, Tangle never raised these arguments below, so we need not 
entertain them.   
  As a general rule, we do not review issues raised for the first time, unless 
prompted to do so by exceptional circumstances.  Gardiner v. V.I. Water & Power 
Auth., 145 F.3d 635, 646-47 (3d Cir. 1998); Abrams v. U.S. Department of the 
Navy, 714 F.2d 1219 1221 n.5 (3d Cir. 1983).  No exceptional circumstances exist 
in this case and Tangle’s brief offers no argument on this point.2  Tangle’s appeal 
on the breach of contract claim must fail.  His complaint avers only that the failure 
                                                 
2
 There is also a significant legal question as to whether Pennsylvania law implies 
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contractual relationship.  
However, we need not reach that issue because Tangle’s argument on that issue is 
not properly before us, and even if it was, there is no evidence showing a breach of 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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to pay constituted a breach.  State Farm has now paid.  Tangle did not seek to 
amend his complaint to aver any lack of good faith or any deficiency in the 
amount paid.  Even if he had, he has adduced no evidence to support such a 
claim.
3
  Accordingly, we will affirm.     
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 At Tangle’s own deposition, he admitted that the PPI was “incomplete,” and that 
items listed on the form as being destroyed had actually been stolen after the fire.  
Therefore, Tangle needed some other evidence to specifically show what his loss 
was to avoid summary judgment.  However, Tangle produced no additional 
evidence.  Thus not only are we are left in the dark about the total loss Tangle 
believes he suffered, we are also left in the dark about what evidence Tangle could 
possibly use to prove that his personal property losses exceeded State Farm’s 
estimate.  Tangle did not submit an affidavit declaring the amount of his losses.  
No one else who was living in his home testified about its contents. There are no 
receipts to document the items Tangle had in his home before the fire.  There are 
no documents demonstrating that Tangle made an effort to acquire any receipts.  
In addition, there is nothing to show that State Farm’s calculations were inaccurate 
or unreasonable.  In sum, Tangle produced no evidence showing he suffered any 
damage, much less evidence with which his damages could be calculated “to a 
reasonable certainty” as required by Pennsylvania law. Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 
322 F.3d 218, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2003)(internal citations omitted). 
